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This report outlines and assesses the substantial shifts in both collective and individual 
employment law in the United Kingdom since 1979. Against the background of a unique 
legal tradition and recent labour market trends, the paper summarises the step-by-step 
strategy of restricting trade union i.mmunities in relation to industrial action, etc. It 
suggests that many new features, such as compulsory strike ballots~ will survive a future 
change in political control. On employee statutory rights the direction of change has been 
less consistent. Major tensions are apparent between the Conservative Government's de-
regulatory instincts and both the standard-setting directives from the European Union and 
significant court judgments on issues such as equal opportunities and equal pay. 
This paper is intended to summarise the far-reaching changes which have taken place in 
employment law in Britain in the period since the election of the Conservative Government 
led by Mrs Thatcher in 1979. Conservative governments have held power in the United 
Kingdom continuously since 1979, and the refotnl of the law relating to trade unions has 
been a central priority throughout that period. The legislation has been radical, with a 
succession of statutes introduced incrementally at (approximately) two year intervals aimed 
principally at regulating and curtailing many of the historical freedoms of trade unions, 
particularly in relation to industrial disputes, the closed shop and internal governance. 
These policies hav~e been consistent in their broad interventionist thrust, although the precise 
focus of the statutes at particular times has differed. In aggregate they have produced a 
structure of legal restraints on trade union behaviour which contrasts starkly with the 
traditional situation of relative abstentionism and "collective laissez-faire" that characterised 
this ,area for most of the present century (McCarthy, ed., 1992). In individual employment 
law the process and direction of change has been less simple, with the Conservative 
Government's early drive to reduce the statutory rights of individual employees, inherited 
from the predecessor Labour Government, being increasingly constrained and frustrated by 
new directives and judgments emanating from the European Union (EU). 
For ,ease of exposition the paper has two principal sub-divisions, dealing first with collective 
1 and then with individual employment law. These are preceded by brief overviews of the 
broad historical characteristics of British employment law, and secondly som,e key features 
of the economic and social context in which the refotms have been introduced. 
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The tra~ditional role of the Jaw in British industrial relations 
Conventionally the system of industrial relations for much of the twentieth ~century 
regarded as distinctive in internationally comparative tettns, mainly in relation to the scop 
given to voluntary action by ~employers and. trade unions,. and the relative lack 
involvement of the law (and lawyers) in peacetime. Trade uruon freedoms, for exampl 
rested on a series of statutory immunities from the operation of civil law torts rather 
on a framework of positiv~e statutory rights. This status allowed many of the immuniti 
to be criticised as "privileges", particularly during the 1960s and 1970s when it 
increasingly common for the failings of Britain's relative economic perfortnance to 
attribut~ed to "excessive" trade union power. Other key features of the British tradition 
the absence of legal obligations on employers to recognise or bargain with trade uni 
representing their work forces, the lack of legal enforceability of collective agreements 
the parties to them, the voluntary nature of third party intervention, e.g. conciliation ...u..:&\, 
arbitration and the associated lack of compulsory powers available to governments · 
industrial disputes, short of the declaration of states of emergency. Perhaps surprisingly 
given the imagery attached to the changes introduced since 1979, all these features · 
State intervention in the setting of substantive minima and statutory employment rights 
creating machinery for their enforcement was also minimal, being essentially confined 
health and safety and a partial approach to minimum pay standards which applied only 
areas of employment where the (preferred) system of collective bargaining had failed 
develop. Prior to 1979, collective bargaining, whilst increasingly constrained in the 196 
and 1970s by successive governmental attempts to restrain wage and price inflation throu 
a variety of incomes policies, was supported only by some indirect legislative props - s'UV1 
as the Fair Wages Resolution which set minimum standards on contractors to publi 
authorities. Individual employment rights were also largely left to the contents of individ'UL.L: 
employment contracts and (where applicable) the provisions of collective agreements. T · 
tradition was breached in the 1960s when statutory rights were introduced in relation 
minimum periods of notice of dismissal, statutory minimwn compensation in the event o 
redundancy, in 1970 by the Equal Pay Act and in 1971 by the introduction of remedies 
"unfair dismissal". 
The system of industrial relations in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s was thus predominant! 
seen as being voluntarist, centred around the key institution of collective bargaining, whic 
achieved a level of coverage significantly in excess of trade union membership. In 
1960s, increasing criticisms of the system, mainly in t~ex nts of unofficial strikes, workp:auv~ 
earnings drift and restrictive labour practices, led the then Labour Government to set up 
Royal Commission under Lord Donovan to examine the system and specifically to revie 
the case for increased legal regulation. Its report in 1968 focused primarily on the fail. 
effectiveness of multi-employer agreements (especially) in the manufacturing industry, 
the need to reconstruct collective bargaining arrangements, largely through the creation 
more foxxnal structures and more comprehensive agreements at workplace or compan 
levels. It proposed no major changes to the traditional legal framework, for exampl 
eschewing cooling-off periods, strike ballots and the legal enforceability of collecti 
agree~ents, though it did propose legislation to protect employees against unfair dismiss 
Despite, or perhaps because of, its recommendations, subsequent proposals from both maj 
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political parties for changes in the legal framework were at the centre of political 
controversy. The Conservatives' attempt to introduce a North American-style legal 
framework at a stroke through the 1971 Industrial Relations Act ignited huge trade union 
opposition, and early r,epeal by the incoming 1974-79 Labour Government as part of its 
nee-corporatist Social Contract with the unions. The subsequent Thatcher Government's 
policy of detet Inined, but incremental legislation, introduced under an anti -corporatist, 
market-oriented and de-regulatory ideology, plainly owed much to the lessons of the 1971 
approach. Whilst the unions have opposed each tranche of the legislative changes, for a 
variety of reasons their opposition has not been effective. Much of the early legislation, for 
example on picketing and compulsory pre-strike ballots, was electorally popular and its 
removal by a future Labour Govemm,ent has c,eased to be a practical proposition. 
The econ,omic an,d social context 
The election of the first Thatcher Government in 1979 heralded a significant shift in the 
management of the British economy. The corporatist approach, attempted by predecessor 
gov~ernments, was rejected on grounds of both ideology and ~efficacy. It adopted a 
distinctive style and approach which sharply challenged the underlying principles of the 
post-war settlement (Crouch, 1979), jettisoning any governmental commitment to full 
employment. Priority was given to policies designed to restrain inflation, to promot~e 
individualism and an enterprise culture, to de-regulate the labour market, the privatization 
of substantial elements of the public sector and the introduction of for1ns of competition in 
many remaining areas of public sector services. 
There have been substantial changes in the labour market since the late 1970s, with key 
features being the high levels of unemployment, major changes in the distribution of 
employment, in the occupational structure and in the composition of the labour force. In 
broad tettns the unemployment rate rose from around two percent in the early 1970s and 
four percent in the late 1970s to levels of around ten percent for most of the 1980s and 
1990s. (Figures in this section are taken from the Employment Gazette, various issues). 
The sectoral distribution of labour saw employment in manufacturing fall by almost two 
million between 1979 and 1984, and with subsequent r,eductions it now accounts for less 
than 20 percent of the total. Service sector employment, which is generally lowly 
unionised, has increased gr,eatly. The number of self-employed grew substantially in the 
1980s, and the absolute total working population rose throughout the decade, reflecting an 
increase in the proportion of women in the labour force to almost half. Over 40 percent 
JP of the ten million women employees had part-time jobs. So-called "'male manual'' work has 
greatly diminished; the proportion of employees in "marginal" or at)'pical fotrns of 
employment has greatly increased, and perceived employment insecurity has become much 
mor,e widespread than in earlier post-war decades. At the same time there have been 
substantial increases in labour productivity and inflation rates have fallen dramatically from 
the levels of the later 1970s and early 1980s. 
Many of these changes ,are reflected in changes in the workplace. Shifts in the distribution 
of jobs partially account for the drop in trade union membership from the record high of 
over 13 million in 1979 to less than nine million. Surveys of industrial relations (e.g. 
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Millward et al., 1992) chart the reduced coverage of collective bargaining, and i 
diminished influence in det~ennining the pay and conditions of employees. There has oee:n: 
a significant shift in the balance of power in favour of employers, and a pronounced 
managerial emphasis on both the individualisation of employment relationships and o 
flexibility of employment practices. The de-layering of management, perfonnance related 
pay, appraisal and a panoply of new employee management practices such as new direct 
employee communications arrangements and quality initiatives have been introduced - albeit 
not always successfully (Marchington et al., 1992).. The number of large workplaces has 
fallen. The number of stoppages of work due to industrial disputes has fallen to record lo 
levels. 
COLLECTIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW 
The focus in this section is on the changes introduced by successive Conservative 
Governments led by Mrs Margaret Thatcher (1979-90) and Mr John Major (since 1990) · 
the legal provisions relating to trade unions, to industrial disputes and some other matters 
associated with the de-regulation of the British labour market. As indicated earlier, these 
areas have - by design -been a repeated subject of progressively restrictive legislation over 
this period, making it one of the most frequently changing areas of statute law. Although 
there has been an underlying consistency of purpose, the sequential process created by this 
strategy has added to the complexity of the law and to a degree its uncertainty in some 
areas. To reflect the process, and to illustrate the developing character of the legislation, 
the main provisions are sununarised chronologically, followed by a brief assessment of 
current position. 
Th~e Employment Act 1980 
This first Act dismantled some of the provisions of the preceding Labour Government's 
1975 Employment Protection Act (EPA) and foreshadowed later dev,elopments in relation 
to strike ballots, picketing, the closed shop and secondary industrial action. For example, 
it repealed the procedure first introduced in 197 5 through which trade unions could refj 
claims for union recognition to the independent Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS) for inquiry and report, and (in the event of the failure of the employer 
recognise following a valid ACAS recommendation) refer pay and conditions in the finn 
to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) for a binding award. Secondly it repealed 
Schedule 11 of the EPA through which .Unions could seek enforceable awards from th 
CAC where an employer was observing tenns and conditions of employment less 
favourable than "recognised" or "general'' levels in the trade or industry concem,ed. Repeal 
of the latter removed one of the indirect supports for collective bargaining which had 
lengthy history. The Act sought to encourage union postal ballots over industrial action, 
election of officials etc. by :making public funds available for this purpose. The attack o 
the closed shop began with the introduction of a right "not to be unreasonably excluded 
expelled" from a trade union, and of compensation in the event of dismissal for non-
membership if, inter alia, the closed shop had not been approved by a secret ballot majority 
of 80 percent. It also outlawed certain fonns of industrial action aimed at enforcing th 
British Industrial Law Reform 309 
closed shop. The first steps against secondary industrial action (e.g. sympathy strikes) were 
taken, confining immunities to situations where there were direct commercial contracts 
between the employers, and setting other hurdles. The Government took powers to 
introduce its own Codes of Practice, to be taken into account by courts and industrial 
tribunals, and subsequently introduced Codes on picketing, the closed shop and (later) on 
the conduct of industrial action ballots. The Act brought a new definition of lawful 
picketing, confining this to the employee's own workplace and making secondary picketing 
unlawful. 
Th~e Employment Act 1982 
The principal foci were the closed shop, the legal definition of trade disputes and limiting 
the legal immunities of trade unions. The Act broadened the circumstances in which 
dismissal for non-membership of a trade union in a closed shop was to be regarded as 
unfair and considerably enhanced the compensation payable. The definition of a "trade 
dispute" - the key to a wide range of trade union immunities - was narrowed to exclude for 
example inter-union disputes, and to confine it to disputes over a specified list of issues 
between workers and their ovm employer. Within this narrower definition the Act made 
it possible for trade unions themselves to be sued if they were responsible for "unlawful" 
acts, with maximum awards of damages related to union size. It broadened the range of 
circumstances in which injunctions could be sought successfully against trade unions by 
making them liable for any unlawful action organised by their employed officials or 
committees in the absence of repudiation by a more authoritative body or person. The law 
on the dismissal of employees participating in industrial action was clarified, removing the 
possibility of their bringing successful actions for unfair dismissal provided the dismissals 
were not selective nor made so by selective offers of re-engagem~ent within a three month 
period. 
The Fair Wages Resolutions of the House of Commons (periodically revised after first 
introduction in tbe 1890s) obliged government contractors - and in practice most private 
sector contractors to the public sector - to observe terins and conditions of employment not 
less favourable than those in collective agreem~ents for that trade or industry, or "the general 
nion level". As such they tended to protect unorganised workers and frequently those on low 
er ta pay. Howev~er, this method of ~extending some minimwn provisions of collective 
f~ agreements to those not party to them threatened to constrain the cost -cutting possibilities 
:a]ed of the ~Government's policy of opening up some directly provided areas of public services 
to competitive tendering (e.g. school and hospital cleaning, refuse collection). The Fair 
less Wages Resolution was rescinded by the Government in 1983. 
:peJI 
ad 
The Tra~de Union Act 1984 
As its name suggests, the Act was principally concerned with the regulation of internal 
non· trade union matters (introduced under the slogan of "giving the trade unions back to their 
ari~ members") including the introduction of secret ballots prior to industrial action. In the 
~the foitner area the Act overrode many of the existing arrangements for internal detnocracy in 
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trade unions by requiring that all voting members of union executive committees should be 
elected every five years by direct secr~et ballot of members, and gave members rights to 
complain if disenfranchised to the Certification ~Officer or through the courts. . N~ew 
provisions were also introduced in r~elation to unions whlch, under the 1913 Trade Union 
Act had established separate political funds to allow them to spend money furthering 
political objectives, e.g. financial support_ ~fthe Labour Pa:tY, po~itical campaigns, et~. The 
Act did not change the existing provisions under whtch unton members contributed 
separately to a union's political fund nor alter the opting-out arrangement, but required 
unions wishing to retain political funds to conduct secret ballots of members every ten 
years. In the event, no such ballot produced a majority against, and several unions which 
previously did not have a political fund introduced one. 
Of wider significance was the Act's provision r~emoving immunity from legal action in 
cases where trade unions did not hold a ballot before authorising or endorsing a strike or 
other fotin of industrial action. Unions were liable for actions by union committees and 
employed officials (i.e. not those organised or led unofficially by shop stewards), and 
liability for the fanner could be avoided if endorsement/authorisation was quickly 
repudiated in writing by higher authority in the union. Those ~entitled to vote are all those, 
and only those, whom it is reasonable for the union to believe will be called on to take 
action, and the ballot fonn must not only invite a Yes/No answer but must specify whether 
the action involves the voter in a breach of his/her employment contract (or interference 
with its perfor1nance). Immunity depends on the ballot demonstrating majority support, and 
is removed if the ballot is held more than four weeks before industrial action starts. Postal 
ballots were not compulsory. If a ballot is not held, employers, suppliers or customers who 
suffer loss through interference with contracts may sue for an injunction to restrain the 
action and/or for damages. 
The Employment Act 1988 
This wide-ranging statute, introduced after the third successive Conservative election 
victory, again focused mainly on how trade unions operated internally, and was designed 
to strengthen further the statutory rights of individual union members in various ways. For 
example, the Act extended the right of those entitled to restrain industrial action without a 
ballot to those called upon to participate in it. A ne¥l publicly-funded Commissioner for 
the Rights of Trade Union Members was created, with duties including assisting trade 
union members to bring legal actions against their union, e.g. by paying for legal advice 
and representation. Fallowing the protracted miners' strike, the Act contained a lengthy list 
of grounds on which it is unjustifiable for a union to take disciplinary action against 
mem~ers, includi~g most controversially, a right not to be "unjustifiably disciplined" by 
a urn on !or refusing to take part in industrial action or for crossing a picket line (or 
encouraging others to do so) even if the action has been supported by a majority in a ballot 
(th~ so-ca~led "~lack legs charter"). There was some fine-tuning of the required conduct 
of 1~dustr1al ,action ballots, with a change to the foun of words used on the ballot paper, 
and ~~ one of th~ most complex sections, detailed rules regulating the "electorate" in Jnulti-
estabhshment d1sputes. The Act closed some gateways in the 1980 and 1982 Acts by 
ren1oving legal immunity protection from industrial action or other pressure to create or 
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maintain closed shops. The forms of secret balloting were further ·bed, the 
workplace and in favour of the home, by a requirement that ballots concerning Trade UDion 
political funds and elections to union governing bodies must be fully postal, and vva 
IDlder the auspices of independent scrutineers . 
The Employment Act 1990 
The 1990 Act finally removed all forms of legal protection for the closed shop by providing 
a right of complaint to an industrial tribunal for anyone refused employment on the ground 
of non-membership (or membership) of a trade union. Similarly it completed the process 
started in 1980 by making all fottns of secondary action (other than those consequent on 
peaceful picketing) unlawful. It made unions responsible at law if any official (including 
non-employees of the union such as shop stewards) called for industrial action. This was 
the first time the Conservative legislation had directly addressed the important but difficult 
area of vicarious liability for unauthorised or unofficial industrial action. Union liability 
for shop stewards' actions in calling or organising industrial action was only removed if 
senior union officers or committees repudiated the action, without delay, and in the fo1m 
of written notice of repudiation to individual members, containing the following statement: 
Your union has repudiated the call (or calls) for industrial action and will give no support 
to unofficial industrial action taken in response to it (or them). If you are dismissed while 
taking unofficial industrial action, you will have no right to complain of unfair dismissal. 
The scope of immunities was further tightened by removing immunity for organising 
industrial action if the action was in support of an employee dismissed for taking part in 
unofficial action. This was complemented by some greater freedom for employers to 
disnaiss union members who took part in unofficial industrial action by withdrawing their 
rights to claim unfair dismissal. It further extended· the scope of proceedings in which the 
Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union members may grant assistance and introduced 
further requirements to the fot 111 and conduct of industrial action ballots. 
The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
This consolidating measure introduced no substantive changes, but served the useful 
purpose of bringing together the currently operative sections of the various enactments 
relating to collective labour relations, e.g: trade unions and industrial action. 
The Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act ('I'URERA) 1993 
The most recent legislation followed the April 1992 election victory of the Major 
Government, and for a variety of reasons is unlikely to be the last. It introduced an 
extremely wide-ranging "Citizens Charter" type right for individuals as customers to apply 
to the High Court for a restraining order against unlawful industrial action, if it does or is 
likely to delay/interrupt the supply of any goods or services. This radical provision thus 
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opened up the possibility, for ~example, of ~y c?nsumer in the ~eneral public inter_cedi~g 
in an industrial dispute, and potentially complicating the employer s management of It, With 
legal/financial assistance available from a new Comrn~ssioner for Prot~ction against 
Unlawful Industrial Action. It is not confined to the pubhc sector. Extensive changes to 
industrial action ballots included the stipulation that they must be fully postal, thus perhaps 
making them more vulnerabl~e to technical challenges (e.g. over inclusion/exclusion of 
individuals due to mailing lists being slightly out of date). Further, to retain immunities, 
trade unions were required to give employers seven days notice of holding an industrial 
action ballot; to enable the employer( s) to identify those being balloted - an early case led 
to a union being required not just to give categories of employee but to name individuals; 
show the employer(s) a sample voting slip three days before the ballot and infortn the 
employer of the result as soon as reasonably practicable. Still further statutory obligations 
were placed on unions seeking to mount lawful industrial action with the requirement, after 
the ballot, for the trade union(s) to give employers seven days notice of the start of 
industrial action (effectively a potential "cooling off' period which also allows employers 
to prepare arrangements to minimise the impact) and to indicate its nature (e.g. one day 
stoppages or continuous). Independent scrutineers were to be appointed for all industrial 
action ballots, and required to report within four weeks of the ballot. 
TURERA also included a legislative assault on the Trades Union Congress' (TUC's) 
arrangements for regulating inter-union competition for members (the so-called Bridlington 
Rules) which had been in place since the 1930s. This was done by introducing a general 
right not to be excluded or expelled from any trade union, and thus effectively being free 
to choose to join any union whose rules do not restrict membership to workers employed 
in a certain industry or occupation. Associated with this, the Act extended the list of 
member conduct for which unions were prohibited from applying disciplinary sanctions, to 
include threatening to join another union, refusing to work with non-union members or 
members of another union etc. Potentially these "freedom of choice" provisions ·could 
disturb established recognition agreements, chall~enge spheres of influence arrangements 
between unions, and jeopardise single union agreements which had previously been adopted 
by a number of major overseas companies investing in Britain (e.g. Nissan). 
The widespread practice of employers deducting members' Trade Union subscriptions 
directly from payroll (the "check-off') was also regulated by the Act. Initially the draft Bill 
proposed to make it unlawful for an employer to do this without the annual written consent 
of individuals, but following objections from (inter alia) ·employers pointing to the high 
administrative costs this was lengthened to every three years. Whilst the government 
stressed the "protection of individual members" argument, many felt this provision was 
aimed both at reducing union membership and threatening union fmances. A related 
provision made it unlawful for increased deductions to be made unless the employer had 
notified the worker of the increase at l ~east one month in advance and reminded the worker 
of his/her right to withdraw authorisation at any time. Again this provision was seen by 
some as a det~errent both to ~employers continuing check-off arrangements (due to costs and 
vulnerability to legal challenge) and to unions raising subscription levels. Since the passage 
of the Act several unions have sought to persuade members to switch to standing 
orders/ direct debits from personal bank accounts. However, it seems inevitable that the 
Act's provisions will lead to some reduction in union m·embership. The Certification 
Officer's powers on trade union finances were further extended and there were further 
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regulations on TU membership registers, election of officers, ballots on union mergers and 
political fund ballots. Finally the Act removed the duty "to encourage the extension, 
development and refotnl of collective bargaining" (set out in the 1975 EPA) from ACAS's 
aeneral duty to promote the improvement of industrial relations, and also gave the Secretary 
of State a reserve power to require ACAS to charge for certain services. 
Assessment 
Although they were interventionist, contrary to long-established baditions and were 
vehemently opposed by the unions, there is no doubt that much of the early legislation 
commanded widespread public support, especially that limiting picketing and requiring pre-
industrial action secret ballots. Initially there were some instances of unions refusing to 
observe certain provisions, leading to injunctions and sequestration of union assets in a few 
cases, but the majority of unions quickly saw the dangers of direct challenges to the law 
and pinned their faith in the election of a Labour Government which they hoped would 
modify - if not abolish - the new laws. However, conscious of the electoral dangers of 
such a commitment, the Labour Party was - and remains - cautious. There is little doubt 
that many of the provisions will continue under a future Labour Government, even if there 
are amendments to the details, and possibly extension of some principles to other areas, e.g. 
company donations to political parties. 
The impact of the measures is difficult to gauge. The Conservatives are not inclined to 
minimise this, frequently declaring the waning of union power, the assertion of statutory 
rights for members, and the diminution in strikes as directly attributable to the legislation. 
Indeed these claims feature prominently in the Government's periodic assessments of its 
own achievements, and retaining the issue of "trade union refoiin" prominently on the 
political agenda (and a point of contrast to the Labour Party) may produce further 
Conservative legislation in the future. If so, this could include the introduction of "repeat" 
ballots in instances of lengthy industrial action and possibly attaching legal enforceability 
to the procedural sections of collective agreements. Other commentators argue that the 
•ssessntent of impact is less simple, and point to the high levels of unemployment, fears 
about job security, the switch from heavily unionised to lowly unionised sectors of 
employment, declining union membership and other changes as contributory factors in the 
reduction of union power and strike frequency. 
In sharp contrast to the 1970s and early 1980s recent public opinion polls are reporting 
increasingly positive perceptions of unio~, with many fewer people regarding them as too 
. Indeed, there are strong currents of opinion, including those of some employers, 
some of the more recent legislation bas gone too far, that it is becoming ..... ,. 
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them. Whilst comprehensive statistics are not available, ~e evi~ence,. e.g. A~AS Annual 
Reports, suggests that the great majority of ballots support I~dustn~ action, which can often 
assist the union side in collective bargaining. The Increasingly complex statutory 
prescriptions about the conduct of ballots are held by so~e to .be no~ so detailed and so 
onerous as to make it extr,emely difficult to conduct an Industrial action ballot lawfully -
due to the risk of injunctions on t,echnicalities. Indeed, some suggest that the present 
provisions are actually designed to deter ballots, and therefore lawful industrial action! At 
the same time the thr,eat of legal actions has fostered increased control by union head 
offices over local stoppages and other fortns of action (see Martin et al., 1991). Despite 
the copious new rights for employers, for union members, for customers and others 
established by the various statutes, the level of litigation has remained surprisingly low and 
has mainly been concentrated in a few sectors (see Evans, 1987). This may stem from a 
variety of factors, including widespread union compliance ,and a continuing disinclination 
of employers and others to regard going to the courts as a useful avenue in all but the most 
trying of circumstances. Where recourse has been made to the legal process in collective 
matters the principal objective appears to have been interim injunctions - which in general 
the courts have been ready to grant. Very few cases indeed have proceeded to full hearings 
and awards of damages. 
INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Shrinkage of employment protection rights 
Some individual employment rights also suffered erosion during the years of Conservative 
rule, though in part this is due to developments in the labour market which saw a growth 
in "marginal" workers falling outside the net of employm~ent protection. The statutory 
rights enacted in the 1970s had never been of general application. Their coverage was 
based very largely on the "standard'' r,elationship of full-time petntanent employment, being 
dependent upon a qualifying period of continuous employment of at least 16 hours per 
week for a period of two years. This period was extended to five years in the case of part-
timers working between eight and 16 hours per w,eek. 
The 1980s saw a major restructuring of the labour market involving an increase in non-
standard fotrns of employment. Many reasons have been put forward for this shift away 
from the standard, full-time contract. Some have attributed it to changes in product markets 
and technological conditions, whilst others have seen it as a response to policies of 
deregulation or simply as being linked to the increase in married women with children 
entering the labour market. Whatever the explanation, the number of jobs of indefinite 
duration fell by 1.1 million from 70 percent to 64 percent of total employment between 
1981. and 1987 and were in effect "replaced" by a I. 7 million increase in non-standard jobs 
~akim, 1990). In consequence, the coverage of employm~ent prot,ection was propor-
tionately reduced, so that by 1987, it was being ,claimed that at least a third of workers fell 
outside basic labour law rights (Leighton and Painter, 1987). 
One fot!n of ~on-standard employment which showed a strong and persistent growth rate 
over thts period was self-employm,ent, with a rise in numbers from 2.2 million to 3.3 
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million between 1981 and 1991 (Campbell and Daly, 1992). Yet one million of the 
increase was accounted for by "sole-traders", some of whom exhibited degrees of 
dependency which would bring their self-employed status into question. However, the 
judicial response to classification of these workers has been variable. Thus in Nethennere 
(St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner and Taverna ((1984) IRLR 240), the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged the dependency of female homeworkers employed in unskilled work and 
looked to the "economic realities of the situation" in designating them employees. In 
contrast, regular casual workers whose only source of income derived from working in the 
banqueting department of a large hotel chain, who were subject to the authority of the 
banqueting manager and who could be penalised for refusing work, were regarded as self-
employed (0 'Kelly v Trusthouse Forte (1983) ICR 728). On this occasion the Court of 
Appeal took a theoretical approach to the obligation by the parties to offer and to accept 
the work, and were influenced by the custom and practice in the industry of regarding 
casual workers as self-employed. 
The erosion in employment protection through labour market developments was 
accompanied, from the time the Conservatives returned to power in 1979, by specific 
amendments to the legislation. They began by immediately doubling the service 
qualification for unfair dismissal from six months to 12 months (SI 1979 No '959), and the 
following year the Employment Act 1980 was passed. In pursuance of a recurring theme 
that special protection should be given to the small employers regarded as vital to wealth 
creation, it further extended the unfair dismissal service qualification to two years, and 
reduced maternity rights, in businesses employing less than 20 employees. The number of 
those excluded from the right to claim unfair dismissal was also increased by providing that 
such rights could henceforth be waived in a fixed tetnl contract of one year or more, as 
opposed to the previous requirement of at least two years. Provisions related to industrial 
tribunal procedure shifted the burden of proving "reasonableness" from employers in unfair 
dismissal cases, and required tribunals specifically to take account of the size and 
administrative resources of the employer's undertaking in deciding whether an employer 
had acted reasonably. 
In 1 '985 the longer qualifying period for unfair dismissal claims was applied to all 
employees by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer's "Budget for Jobs", on the apparent 
premise that this would encourage employers to recruit more freely and hence lead to an 
increase in jobs. Nine years on, this amendment has been challenged by two women as 
being indirectly sex discriminatory (R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte 
Seymour-Smith and Perex (1994) IRLR 448.) Though the women were unsuccessful, it is 
interesting to note that the Divisional court rejected the claim that the raising of the 
qualifying threshold from one to two years has had a notable effect in promoting the 
creation of job opportunities. Mr Justice McCullough stated that "'if the changes (to the 
qualifying period) had to any significant extent increased opportunities for employment I 
would have expected that by 1994 hard evidence of this would have been presented to the 
court." 
In addition to the strategy of seeking to reduce labour costs by attacking employment rights, 
the government also brought about changes to reduce directly the primary ingredient of 
labour costs, namely wages. The Wages Act 1986 weakened the power of Wages Councils, 
which had existed since 1909 and established minimum wages, holidays and other basic 
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te1 111s and conditions in low paying industries such as the hotel and catering industry. It 
also removed employees aged under 21 from their scope, on the basis that to regulate the 
pay of young people acted as a disincentive to their recruitment. ~he subsequent abolition 
of the Councils by the Trade Union Refottn and Employment Rights Act 1993 has now 
removed 2,500,000 workers from statutory minimwn wage-fixing machinery. Moreov~er 
it is argued (see e.g. Hendy, 1993; Wilkinson & Deakin, 1991) that the government's 
strategy of r~educing wages as an element of labour costs is dangerous because: "A low 
wage policy tends to produce a low skill, high turnover, low productivity and poorly 
managed workforce." (Hendy, 1993 :32). 
Effect of European law 
In almost direct opposition to the Conservatives' policy of deregulation, the European 
Community (now European Union) has increasingly highlighted its "social dimension"' by 
introducing directives aimed at increasing the statutory prot~ection of employed people. As 
would be expected the United Kingdom government set its face against such moves and 
consistently blocked directives introduced during the 1980s such as those on par~ental leave, 
the burden of proof in discrimination cases and worker participation. In 1989 the United 
Kingdom alone among the 12 member states refused to sign up to the Community Charter 
of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (The "'Social Charter"), and later very overtly 
distanced itself from the Community's attempt to mov~e forward towards implementation 
of the aims of the Social Charter by negotiating a United Kingdom opt-out from the 
Protocol to the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. 
Though the United Kingdom may not be bound in the future by new ,Community legislation 
in this area, existing directives cannot be side-stepped. They must be implemented by 
member states so as to achieve the result intended by the directiv~e. Yet the United 
Kingdom's grudging attitude towards compliance has led repeat~edly to accusations of 
failure to implement directives fully, and the government has been obliged to comply by 
amending the relevant legislation. Thus the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983 
were the government's hasty and much-criticised attempt to implement the concept of 
"equal pay for work of equal value" demanded by the Equal Pay Directive (75/117) 
following infringement proceedings brought by the European Commission (Commission of 
the European Communities v United Kingdom of~Great Britain and Northern Ireland (19:84) 
IRLR 29). Similarly, the Sex Discrimination Act 1986 was the government's response to 
the allegation that, by failing to outlaw sex discrimination in retirem~ent ages, and by 
excluding employers with five or fewer employees from the scope of the Sex 
Discrimination Act I 975, it was in breach of the Equal Tr~eatment Directive (76/207). More 
recently, the statutory ceiling (of £11,000) on compensation in sex discrimination claims 
has also been held to breach this Directive, and it was removed in 1993 by the Sex 
Discrimination and Equal Pay (Remedies) Regulations (legislation to amend similarly the 
Rac,e Relations Act 1976 followed shortly afterwards). 
Ev~en legislation passed specifically to implement Directives has been found wanting and 
required subsequent amendment. Based on five heads of complaint, the European Court 
of Justice (E,CJ) recently declared that the United Kingdom government had failed to fulfil 
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obligations arising from the Acquired Rights Directive (77 /187) despite its attempt to do 
so by means of the much litigated Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 1981 (see eg Napier, 1993). The subject matter of four of the complaints had, 
by the time of the judgment, been rectified by specific sections of the Trade Union RefoiJn 
and Employment Rights Act 1993, but the remaining matter outstanding is of some 
significance. The Directive had required representatives of employees affected by a transfer 
of an undertaking to be infortned and consulted about it. The ECJ was unmoved by the 
United Kingdom's argument that the Directive could not have been intended to undetnline 
the principle of "voluntary recognition" of trade wrions, and found that in failing to provide 
a mechanism for the designation of employee representatives in an undertaking where no 
union was recognised the United Kingdom government was in breach. 
It would not be surprising if the United Kingdom were again to do the minimum required, 
by establishing machinery simply to deal with business transfers (and redundancy, since 
there was found to be a similar breach of the Collective Redundancies Directive, 75/I29). 
That was certainly the approach taken when faced with the Directive on the Safety and 
Health of Pregnant Women at Work (92/85). In implementing the Dir~ectiv~e, the 
govenunent was faced with two constraints, first that it could not lessen existing maternity 
rights, and secondly that it had to provide for a minimum maternity leave period of I 4 
weeks. In simply complying with these requirements and no more, the outcome has been 
an extraordinarily complex dual system which has one set of provisions for those women 
who have over two years service and another for those who have not. It seems extremely 
unlikely that even the most able women workers will find it easy to enforce their rights at 
a time when they will have priorities other than the interpretation of statutes. 
Although this "incoming tide of EC labour law" (Ewing, I 993) has increased individual 
employment rights in the United Kingdom, it is not the only way in which Community law 
has exerted a profound influence over domestic law. Bold judgments by the ECJ on the 
interpretation and scope of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome have expanded what may 
legitimately be regarded as "pay" and therefore subject to the principle of sex equality. 
Undoubtedly the most striking of these was the ruling in the Barber case (Barber v 
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group Ltd ( 1990) IRLR 240) that occupational 
pensions were "pay" for the purposes of Article 119, a ruling which caused turmoil 
throughout the pensions industry. Recognising that the overwhelming majority of part-time 
workers are women, the court has also increasingly regarded unfavourable treatment of part-
time workers as indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex, and unless justified, contrary 
to the Equal Pay and Equal Treatment Directives. 
ex At the heart of the debate over part-timers' rights are the provisions of the domestic 
Dre legislation which excluded them totally from employment protection if fewer than eight 
hours per week were worked, and required a five year qualifying period if the hours of 
work were between eight and sixteen. In 1994, the Equal Opportunities Commission 
claimed a major victory by successfully challenging this legislation in the courts by way 
of judicial review (R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte EOC (1994) IRLR 493). 
In defending the claim, the Secretary of State did not challenge the discriminatory effect 
nd of the law, but fell back once more on the well-worn argument that the purpose of the 
qualifying thresholds was to bring about an increase in availability of part-time work. 
Whilst accepting that to increase part-time work was an acceptable aim, the House of Lords 
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ruled that reducing the costs to employers of employing part-time . worke~s ~as not 
suitable way of achieving such an aim. Moreover ther~ _was an outright reJeC!Ion of the 
Secretary of State's "evidence" that the threshold provisions had actually achieved 
stated aim. In the words of Lord Keith: 
The evidence for the Secretary of State consisted principally of an affidavit by an official in the 
Department of Employment which set out the views of th~ Department but did not con~n anything 
capable of being regarded as factual evidence demonstrating the correctness of these v1ews. 
Though the outcome of the case for the government is again an obligation to amend its 
legislation, dismissed part-time workers need not await this. Because the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal has declared that unfair dismissal is, like redundancy pay, to be regarded 
as pay for the purposes of Article 119 (Mediguard Services Ltd v. Thame (1994) IRLR 
504), individuals may simply rely on their directly enforceable rights under this Article (see 
e.g. Warren and Wylie (1994) IRLR 316). 
Assessment 
Several distinct themes have emerged in examining legal dev~elopments in the United 
Kingdom since 1979. The most notable in tetins of individual labour law .has been the 
tension between the government's moves towards deregulation and the reducing the 
"burdens on employers", and the drive by European Community lawmakers towards 
increased protective regulation. At present the United Kingdom government shows no sign 
of altering its stance. It has voiced its opposition to draft directives on Parental Leav,e, on 
Temporary Workers and on Young People in Employment, and having swept away the 
remaining protective legislation on working hours of women and young people in the 
Employment Act 1989, is now challenging the legal basis of the Working Time Directive. 
(This was introduced as a health and safety measure and thus under EU proc,edures requires 
only qualified majority voting in order to be adopted). 
Challenges continue to legislation which arguably does not fully implement community 
obligations. Because of the complexity of the equal value legislation and the inordinate 
length of time taken by some cases to proceed through the legal route (see e.g. British Coal 
Corporation v Smith and others (1994) IRLR 342) the Equal Opportunities Commission is 
now alleging a breach of Article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive. The TUC has also 
lodged a fonnal ~complaint with the European Commission, arguing that the abolition of the 
Wages Councils will in particular leave . many women in low-wage industries with no 
effective means of redress against unlawful reductions in their wages (TUC, 1993). 
On the collective front the government has sharply r,educed trade union immunities, and 
outlawed some union practices such as the closed shop and secondary industrial action. It 
has repeatedly added further statutory pre-requisites on unions prior to lawful industrial 
acti~n an~ progressively broadened the categories of people who can seek injunctions 
against s~kes th~t may not satisfy the detailed criteria for legality. Vicarious liability for 
unauthonsed act~ons, e.g. by workplace representatives and unofficial strikes, has been 
attached unambiguously to the unions. The government has also been heavily 
interventionist in union internal affairs, and established many statutory rights for union 
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members. These are backed by two new Commissioners empowered to assist, with 
financial and legal support, those seeking to bring legal actions against trade unions. Other 
than in connection with race and sex discrimination, similar support from public funds or 
agencies is not available to employees wishing to complain of br~each of their statutory 
rights. No obstacles have been placed in the way of employers wishing to de-recognise 
unions. Indeed, the Conservatives' preference for individual negotiation rather than 
collective bargaining or statutory regulation was c],early demonstrated by the mechanism 
chosen for reforrn of the antiquated Truck Acts by the Wages Act 1986. In addition to 
removing the right to cash pay, the Act stripped away blanket prohibitions on deductions 
from wages, and replaced them by provisions permitting deductions via contractuaJ 
"agreement". 
If one piece of legislation can be said to encapsulate the themes which have ~emerged over 
the last 15 years, it is the Trade Union Reforn1 and Employment Rights Act. In its 
insistence on additional requirements for lawful strike ballots, its assault on the Bridlington 
Rules and the new conditions for operating check-off systems, it can certainly be seen as 
placing obstacles in the paths of trade unions and potentially damaging trade union 
membership. One section particularly worthy of note is section 13, which was added very 
• 
much at the elev~enth hour as a response to the Court of Appeal's decision in the cases of 
Wilson v Associated Newspapers Ltd and Palmer and another v Associated British Ports 
(1993) IRLR 336. The Court of Appeal had held that an employer who offer~ed a financial 
inducement to employees to abandon collectively-bargained pay and conditions in favour 
of so-called "personal contracts" was acting unlawfully, since this amounted to 
discriminatory treatment against those who refused to sign, in order to deter them from 
union membership. Although one purpose of the employer's action was simply to move 
away from collective bargaining, the ~Court held that a second purpose was to create a 
situation where the union "withered on the vine". In effect, section 13 now requires that 
the second (unlawful) purpose must be disregarded unless a tribWlal takes the view that no 
reasonable employer would have acted in the way he or she did in order to alter 
employment r,elationships. 
In marked contrast, the Act also embodies the requir~ements of no fewer than five EC 
directives. In addition to making the required amendments on transfers of undertakings and 
redundancy and granting new maternity rights, provisions originating in a health and safety 
directive of 1989 give new protection against dismissal and other detrimental treatment 
where workers take action believing that their health and safety is in imminent danger. 
Implementation of the Proof of Employment Relationship Directive also improves the rights 
of temporary work~ers by providing for written particulars of employment within two 
months of employment rather than 13 weeks. As a whole the A~ct will bring some 
protection for many "marginal workers" because its new unfair dismissal rights will apply 
regardless of hours of work or length of service. 
Though life may have been relativ~ely quiet on the collective litigation scene the sam~e 
cannot be said for applications to ~enforce individual rights. In 1990/91 the number of cases 
disposed of by industrial tribunals was 35,826; by 1992/93 this had risen to 53,445 
(Employment Gazette, November 1993). Given the nevv individual rights in the 1993 Act 
and the long-awaited jurisdiction over breach of contract claims first enacted in the 
Employment Protection Act 1975 but never exercised, it seems reasonable to predict that 
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the work of the tribunals is set to increase still further. It also seems reasonable to predict 
that what~ever be the policies of the government in power in the foreseeable £uture, the role 
of the law is unlikely to diminish. 
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